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Choice of parametersAbstract
In this paper we use the Generalized Taylor Economy (GTE)
framework in which there are many sectors with overlapping contracts
of di￿erent lengths to analyze the design of monetary policy. We derive
a utility based objective function of a central bank for this economy
and use it to evaluate the performance of alternative simple rules. We
￿nd that a simple rule that targets an index that gives more weight
to the sectors which have longer contracts and are more important
in the aggregate index yields a welfare outcome nearly identical to
the optimal policy. However, we ￿nd that potential gains in targeting
sector speci￿c in￿ation rates rather than the aggregate in￿ation rate
is very sensitive to the shape of the distribution. We show that ex-
cept for the cases where prices/wages are reoptimized very frequently,
the performance of the sectoral rule can be closely approximated by a
simple rule that targets aggregate in￿ation.
Keywords: In￿ation targeting, Optimal Monetary Policy.
JEL: E32, E52, E58.
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September 2006Non-Technical Summary
The implications of sectoral heterogeneity for the design of monetary
policy is an important question for policy makers. While there is a growing
literature assesing this question, attention has mainly focussed on models
with two sectors. By using models with two sectors, many authors have
argued that targeting the economy wide in￿ation is not optimal and can result
in signi￿cant welfare losses. Instead, they suggest an in￿ation measure that
puts more weight on the sector where there is a longer contract. However,
this result may be misleading. The reason is that more realistic cases would
require to go beyond the simple case of two-sector economies and instead
consider economies in which there are many sectors with di￿erent contract
lengths. Therefore, it remains an open question as to how monetary policy
should be set in such an environment.
We address this question by using the Generalized Taylor Economy (GTE)
set out in Dixon and Kara(2005b), in which there are potentially many sec-
tors, each with a Taylor contract of a particular length. The unique feature
of the GTE framework is that it allows us to model any distribution of con-
tract lengths, including the one generated by the Calvo model. Following
the literature, we start with the assumption that the central bank adopted
an in￿ation targeting regime and use the GTE framework to extend this
literature by considering the design of welfare-maximizing in￿ation targeting
monetary policy rules in a setting where there are multiple sectors.
We ￿rst examine the monetary policy implications of alternative assump-
tions regarding the distribution of contract lengths and explore how to assign
weights to di￿erent sectors in an index for a central bank to target. We then
compare the performance of the aggregate in￿ation targeting relative to the
sectoral rule and ask whether it is necessary for a well-designed monetary
policy to respond to sector-speci￿c in￿ations.
We also address the issue of welfare function in such a setting. We derive
a utility based objective function of a central bank in our model by following
the procedure described in Rotemberg and Woodford(1998) and illustrate
the challenge facing the central bank in an environment in which there are
many sectors. In particular, we show that welfare in the GTE depends on
the variances of output gap and on the cross-sectional price dispersion in
each sector. We ￿nd that in the GTE framework it is impossible for the
central bank to simultaneously stabilize all the objectives and therefore the
￿rst-best allocation cannot be achieved. Given the existence of a trade-o￿,
5
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September 2006under this objective function, we employ Lagrangian methods to determine
the optimal policy and use it as a benchmark to evaluate the performance of
alternative simple rules.
We ￿nd that a simple rule that responds to appropriately weighted av-
erage of the sectoral wage in￿ation rates yields a welfare outcome nearly
identical to the optimal policy. However, we ￿nd that the result that "the
optimal weight is an increasing function of the contract length" does not
generalize beyond the case of two-sector economies. Instead, we show that
sectoral share of the sector is as potentially important as the contract length
in determining the optimal weight for that sector. More speci￿cally, the op-
timal weight increases with the contract length but decreases if the sector’s
share is small. However, in sharp contrast to that of earlier studies, in which
it is argued that targeting aggregate in￿ation can result in substantial welfare
losses, we ￿nd that in a setting where there are multiple sectors the increase
in expected welfare relative to the aggregate in￿ation targeting can be fairly
small suggesting that it may not be necessary for a well-designed monetary
policy to respond to sector-speci￿c in￿ations.
6
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"How to deal with heterogeneity in a diversi￿ed currency area
has been an issue at the heart of the debate in Europe all along
the road towards deeper economic integration and already well
before the single currency was introduced."
Otmar Issing (2004)
What are the implications of sectoral heterogeneity for the design of mon-
etary policy is an important question for policy makers. A rapidly growing
literature assesses this question in DGE models which allows for two sec-
tors, such as Woodford (2003) and Aoki (2001), or with two-countries such
as Benigno (2004). By analyzing di￿erent in￿ation targeting policies in the
presence of two sectors with di￿erent contract lengths and then ranking these
policies using the welfare function based on the representative household’s
utility function, these studies conclude that targeting the economy wide in-
￿ation is not optimal and can result in signi￿cant welfare losses. Instead,
they suggest an in￿ation measure that puts more weight on the sector where
there is a longer contract.
Woodford (2003) and the other authors who arrive at the same conclusion,
however, use DGE models which have only two sectors. More realistic case
would require to go beyond the simple case of two-sector economies and
consider economies in which there are many sectors with di￿erent contract
lengths1. Therefore, it remains an open question how monetary policy should
be set in such a setting. In addition, much attention in this literature devoted
to the models which assume Calvo style contracts in each sector2. As shown
by Dixon and Kara (2005a), the Calvo model has a distribution of contract
lengths which has important implications regarding the persistence properties
and the welfare cost estimates of the model. This is because the presence
of long contracts in the Calvo model leads to more persistence and price
dispersion. This ￿nding suggests that a model with Calvo distribution may
overstate the gains from di￿erent in￿ation stabilization policies. As Kiley
1One exception is the model by Mankiw and Reis (2002). However, Mankiw and Reis
use a model in which nominal rigidities arise due to the assumption of sticky information
rather than staggered contracts.
2This excludes the model by Erceg and Levin(2005), who focus on a model which has
two sectors; each with Taylor style contracts. However, they only consider the special case
in which sectors have identical contract lengths.
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where the tail of the distribution is not so large (hence so important)."
Dixon and Kara (2005b) argue that Taylor’s model can be generalized to
allow for a distribution of contract lengths in di￿erent sectors which can be
used to model any distribution of contract lengths, including the one gener-
ated by the Calvo model. In this paper, following the literature, we start
with the assumption that the central bank adopted an in￿ation targeting
regime and use the GTE framework to extend this literature by considering
the design of welfare-maximizing in￿ation targeting monetary policy rules in
a setting where there are multiple sectors. We examine the monetary policy
implications of alternative assumptions regarding the distribution of contract
lengths and explore how to assign weights to di￿erent sectors in an index for
a central bank to target. We then compare the performance of the aggregate
in￿ation targeting relative to the sectoral rule and ask whether it is necessary
for a well-designed monetary policy to respond to sector-speci￿c in￿ations.
We derive a utility based objective function of a central bank in our
model by following the procedure described in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998) and illustrate the challenge facing the central bank in an environment
in which there are many sectors. In particular, we show that welfare in the
GTE depends on the variances of output gap and on the cross-sectional price
dispersion in each sector. We ￿nd that in the GTE framework it is impos-
sible for the central bank to simultaneously stabilize all the objectives and
therefore the ￿rst-best allocation cannot be achieved. Given the existence
of a trade-o￿, under this objective function, we employ Lagrangian methods
to determine the optimal policy and use it as a benchmark to evaluate the
performance of alternative simple rules.
We ￿nd that a simple rule that responds to appropriately weighted av-
erage of the sectoral wage in￿ation rates yields a welfare outcome nearly
identical to the optimal policy. We ￿nd that the result that "the optimal
weight is an increasing function of the contract length" does not generalize
beyond the case of two-sector GTEs. Instead, we show that sectoral share of
the sector is as potentially important as the contract length in determining
the optimal weight for that sector. More speci￿cally, the optimal weight in-
creases with the contract length but decreases if the sector’s share is small.
However, in sharp contrast to that of earlier studies, in which it is argued
that targeting aggregate in￿ation can result in substantial welfare losses, we
￿nd that in a setting where there are multiple sectors the increase in expected
welfare relative to the aggregate in￿ation targeting can be fairly small sug-
8
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respond to sector-speci￿c in￿ations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the model and section 3 describes equilibrium dynamics. Section 4 derives a
welfare function for a central bank based on the representative household’s
utility function. Section 5 characterizes optimal policy and Section 6 analyzes
the implications of various assumptions regarding the distribution of contract
lengths and compares the performance of alternative simple rules. Section 7
concludes.
2 The Model
This section outlines the Generalized Taylor Economy (GTE) set out in
Dixon and Kara (2005b), in which there are potentially many sectors, each
with a Taylor contract of a particular length. The GTE approach allows us
to model any distribution of contract lengths, including the one generated
by the Calvo model.
In the model economy, there is a continuum of ￿rms f 2 [0;1], each pro-
ducing a single di￿erentiated good combined to produce a ￿nal consumption
good: The production of intermediate goods requires labour as the only in-
put. Corresponding to the continuum of ￿rms f there is a unit interval of
household-unions. The economy is divided into many sectors where the i￿th
sector has a simple Taylor contract length of T = i periods. The share
of each sector is given by ￿i with
PN
i=1 ￿i = 1: Within each sector, each
￿rm is matched with a ￿rm-speci￿c union and there are Ni cohorts of equal
size. The share of each cohort j within the sector i is given by ￿ij where PNi
j=1 ￿ij = 1. The interval of ￿rm-unions corresponding to cohort j in sec-
tor i can formally be expressed as: f 2
h





i and ^ ￿ij = jN
￿1
i : Since the cohorts are of equal size and there
are as many cohorts as period, ￿ii￿1 contracts are reset in each period in
sector i .The representative household derives utility from consumption, real
money balances and leisure. The representative household-union in each sec-
tor chooses the reset wage to maximize lifetime utility given labour demand
and the additional constraint that nominal wages will be ￿xed for Ti periods
in which the aggregate output and price level are given:
9
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A typical ￿rm in the economy produces a di￿erentiated good which requires
labour as the only input, with a CRS technology represented by
Yft = AitLft (1)
where ait = log Ait is a productivity shock in sector i and follows the
AR(1) process: ait = ￿iait + "it: f 2 [0;1] is ￿rm speci￿c index.
Single di￿erentiated good Y (f) is combined to produce a ￿nal consump-
tion good Y: The production function here is CES with constant returns and


























The ￿rm chooses fPft;Yft;Lftg to maximize pro￿ts subject to (4,??),





























Where " = ￿
￿￿1 measures the markup. ￿ denotes a subsidy to employ-
ment, which re￿ects our assumption that the labour income is subsidized in
10
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the model prices are equal to marginal cost, as in the perfectly competitive
economy. Price is an e￿ective markup (adjusted for subsidy) over marginal
cost.
2.2 Household-Unions and Wage Setting






t [U(Cht) + V (1 ￿ Hht)]
#
(8)
where Cht, Hht are household h0s consumption and hours worked respectively,








t+1) ￿ Bht + (1 + ￿h)WhtHht + ￿ht ￿ Tht (9)
where Bh(st+1) is a one-period nominal bond that costs Q(st+1 j st) at
state st and pays o￿ one dollar in the next period if st+1 is realized. Bht
represents the value of the household’s existing claims given the realized
state of nature. Wht is the nominal wage, ￿ht is the pro￿ts distributed by
￿rms and WhtHht is the labour income. ￿hw denotes the ￿xed rate at which
labour income is subsidized. Finally, Tt is a lump-sum tax.
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rate. Equation (12) shows that the optimal wage is a constant "mark-up"
(given by " which is adjusted for subsidy) over the ratio of marginal utilities
of leisure and marginal utility from consumption within the contract dura-
tion s = t:::t+T.i ￿1 When Ti = 2, this equation reduces to the ￿rst order
condition in Ascari (2000). As mentioned before, ￿ denotes a subsidy to
household-unions. Therefore, the steady state of the model satis￿es the e￿-
ciency condition that the marginal rate of substitution equals the real wage,
as in a perfectly competitive economy. Note that the index h is dropped
in equations (10) and (12), which re￿ects our assumption of complete con-
tingent claims markets for consumption and implies that consumption is
identical across all households in every period (Cht = Ct):
2.3 The Government
The labour income subsidy is ￿nanced by lump sum taxes so that the gov-
ernment’s budget is balanced every period. In particular,
Tt = ￿WtHt
We do not specify a particular policy at this stage since our objective
is to ￿nd an optimal monetary policy in the economy. However, given any
monetary policy, an equilibrium can be computed.
3 Equilibrium Dynamics
We consider an equilibrium in which each sector i is identi￿ed by the con-
tract length Ti and a household-union in each sector is identi￿ed by the time
at which it can set a new wage. We follow the standard approach of log-
linearizing around the steady state of the model. We follow the notational
convention that lower-case symbols represent log-deviations of variables from
the steady state and variables with astericks denote the equilibrium value of
variables under ￿exible wages.
3.1 The ￿exible wage equilibrium and the natural level
For comparative purposes, we ￿rst characterize the equilibrium of the model
under ￿exible wages. As discussed earlier, with the assumption that the
12
ECB
Working Paper Series No 673
September 2006labour income subsidy exactly o￿sets the distortions associated with the
monopolistic competition, the equilibrium allocation under ￿exible wages
and prices coincides with the e￿cient allocation, as in a perfectly competitive
economy. Therefore, in what follows, we will henceforth referred to as the
Pareto optimum4
Using equation (5) and aggregating for sector i; along with the fact that
the marginal cost is a constant, we can obtain the solution for the sectoral
real aggregate wage of each sector. The aggregate real wage can then be
obtained by simply summing up the real aggregate wage (weighted by sector
share ￿i): By using the solution for the aggregate real wage and the optimal
















To solve for aggregate employment, we ￿rst use the equation (7) and
aggregate for sector i to obtain sectoral employment. Given the solution for
sectoral employment, aggregate employment is then obtained by summing













t = at (15)
where at =
PN
i=0 ￿iait is the weighted average of productivity across
sectors, ￿cc = ￿UccC
Uc is the parameter governing risk aversion, ￿ll =
￿VllL
Vl is
the inverse of the labour elasticity.





t ￿ at (16)
Combining (15) and (16) gives the solution for the natural level of output,
y￿
t;
4See Gali (2003) for a discussion.
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which implies that the natural level of output is a weighted average of
productivity across sectors.
Finally, we can solve for the equilibrium real interest rate by using the











t+1 denotes the real interest rate and ￿￿
t is the
aggregate in￿ation rate.
3.2 The Sticky wage equilibrium
We now turn to characterize the sticky wage equilibrium of the economy. We
render nominal variables such as wage level and price level as stationary by
reexpressing them in terms of log-devations from the aggregate price level.
For example, ~ xit and ~ pit denote the logarithmic deviation of the reset wage
and price level in sector i from the aggregate price level, respectively.














￿~ yt+s + ￿y
￿

















Where ~ yt = yt￿ y￿
t is the output gap, ￿t is the aggregate in￿ation rate and
￿ is the elasticity of substitution of consumption goods.
In each sector i; the sectoral in￿ation is related to the wage level in sector








￿ij [~ xit￿j ￿ ~ pit￿j￿1 ￿ ait] (21)
14
ECB
Working Paper Series No 673
September 2006Where ~ pijt = ~ xit￿j ￿ ait is the logarithmic deviation of the price level in
sector i cohort j from the aggregate price level5.
We then use the log-linearized version of the household’s intertemporal
Euler equation (10) and subtract the ￿exible-wage version to obtain the Euler
equation in terms of output gap, which is given by
~ yt = Et~ yt+1 ￿ ￿
￿1
cc (rt ￿ Et￿t+1 ￿ rr
￿
t) (22)
Using equation (4) and aggregating for sector i yields
yit = ￿(pt ￿ pit) + yt (23)
By using the fact that the linearized price level in the economy is the




￿i~ pit = 0 (24)
where ~ pit can also be expressed as
~ pit = ~ pit￿1 + ￿it ￿ ￿t (25)




￿i (~ pit￿1 + ￿it)
which implies that aggregate in￿ation depends on both sectoral lagged
relative prices and in￿ation levels.
Finally, since nominal rigidities arise due to the assumption of staggered
wages and prices are perfectly ￿exible in the model, wage in￿ation is given
by
5Note that in the sector in which wages are completely ￿exible, that is i = 1; wage de-
cision does not depend on the in￿ation level, as wages can adjust every period. Therefore,
in the ￿exible wage sector, (21) reduces to
~ p1t = ~ x1t ￿ a1t
15
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w
it = ￿it + ￿ait (26)
where ￿w
it denotes the wage in￿ation in sector i and ￿ait = ait ￿ ait￿1:
4 The welfare function for the GTE
This section generalizes the analysis of Rotemberg and Woodford (1998)
and derives a utility based objective function of a central bank to provide
a benchmark for evaluating the performance of alternative in￿ation target-















￿i￿ijV (1 ￿ Hijt)
#
Consumption is identical across all households in every period, which
re￿ects our assumption of complete contingent, whilst labour can vary across
cohorts.
As shown in the appendix, by taking the second-order logarithmic ap-
proximation to this utility function around a steady state, welfare function












where the loss function is given by
Lt =
"









where varij(:) denotes the unconditional variance. This expression im-
plies that welfare loss depends on the variance of the output gap and on the
magnitude of the cross-sectional dispersion in prices in the economy, as in
16
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reduces to the welfare function in a standard one sector model, as in Paustian
(2005). In the case of the GTE, however, in contrast to the one sector model,
where there is only one type of contract length, the central bank also cares
about the variability of price dispersion in di￿erent sectors where sectors
di￿er from their contract length and their budget share. The share of each
sector determines how much the central bank should care about the variabil-
ity of price dispersion in that sector and the contract length determines the
magnitude of the variability of price dispersion in that sector.
Note that the welfare function is roughly analogous to those obtained
under the popular speci￿cation of Calvo contracts. In the case of Calvo con-
tracts, as discussed in Dixon and Kara (2005a), there is a distribution of
contract lengths from 1 to in￿nity. Therefore, a GTE can be setup to give
exactly the same distribution of contracts as in the Calvo model, where the
share of sector, ￿i;is the same as generated by the Calvo model. Although,
they have exactly the same distribution of contracts, there is one main dif-
ference between the Calvo and the Calvo-GTE welfare functions. In the case
of Calvo contracts, in each period there is one reset wage and therefore the













N = 1 Ti = i ￿i = ! (1 ￿ !)
i￿1 i = 1:::1
As shown by Woodford (2003), the welfare costs of cross sectional disper-
sion can be summarized in terms of variability of in￿ation.
However, in the Calvo-GTE there is a distribution of sector speci￿c reset
wages, ~ xit; in each period and therefore in addition to the distribution of
prices across cohorts as in the Calvo model, the GTE has a distribution across
sectors within the cohort. Therefore, as pointed out by Erceg and Levin
(2005), the welfare costs of cross sectional dispersion cannot be summarized
in terms of variability of in￿ation and must be given explicitly in terms of
variances of relative prices.
17
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We turn now to examine the issue of optimal monetary policy. We begin with
considering if the Pareto optimal allocation can be achieved in the GTE. As
the welfare function shows, an equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal in the
GTE only if the relative prices and output gap is zero in every period, that
is ~ yt = ~ pit = 0 for all t:
We demonstrate that in the GTE, it is impossible to satisfy all the stabi-
lization objectives at the same time and therefore Pareto optimal allocation
is not attainable. This is most easily seen by considering the sector in which
the wages are allowed to adjust in every period, where sector i = 2:::n have
contract lengths i. In particular, by combining (19) and (21), the relative
prices in ￿exible wage sector can be expressed as
~ p1t = ￿~ yt + ￿(at ￿ a1t) (28)
A trade-o￿ arises because of the ￿nal term ￿(a￿
t ￿ a1t): Consider, for
example, the case when ~ yt = 0. When ~ yt = 0, (28) implies that ~ p1t =
￿(a￿
t ￿ a1t); which is inconsistent with the requirement that ~ p1t = 0 unless
there is only one shock in the economy which hits the ￿exible wage sector
only.
This simple example illustrates the challenge which the central bank
faces in an environment where there are many sectors with di￿erent con-
tract lengths.
What happens more generally? As the special case already suggests, in
the GTE framework both output gap and sectoral relative prices ￿uctuate
in response to the shocks and these ￿uctuations in output gap and relative
prices lead to a trade-o￿. Therefore, it cannot be possible to satisfy all the
stabilization objectives at the same time.6
5.1 Second-Best Optimal Policy
As the discussion in the previous section reveals, in the GTE it is not possible
to achieve the ￿rst best allocation. Accordingly, in this case one must con-
sider second best optimal policy. We use numerical methods to characterize
6To obtain such a tradeo￿, one approach taken in the literature has been to add an
exogenous shock, which is referred to as "cost-push shock", to the optimal wage setting
rule. In the GTE, policy tradeo￿ arises endogenously.
18
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policy that can be obtained by maximizing the welfare level de￿ned in (27)
subject to the equilibrium conditions (19) - (26). While this is an useful
reference, as discussed in Huang and Liu (2005), it is di￿cult to implement,
as it requires the knowledge of leads and lags of the in￿ation rates and the
output gap. Therefore, we use the central bank’s ￿rst order conditions along
with the equilibrium conditions for the model to solve and calculate the level
of welfare under optimal monetary policy. We then use it as a benchmark
to compare the performance of alternative simple rules with the coe￿cients
in front of the targeting variables are chosen optimally to maximize welfare,
which are considered as feasible and e￿ective tools to implement monetary
policy.
5.2 Alternative Simple Policy Rules
We assume that the central bank has adopted an in￿ation targeting regime.
We consider two policy rules, which are as follows: In the ￿rst case, the
central bank responds to an appropriately weighted average of the sectoral








t represents the wage in￿ation in sector i: The weight that sector




7Given the fact that nominal rigidities in our model arise due to the assumption of
sticky wages and therefore wage stickiness plays a crucial role in determining welfare cost
of business cycles, here we consider the cases in which the in￿ation measure that the central
bank chooses to target is the wage in￿ation rather than the price in￿ation, as it is already
suggested by Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000). In another exercise which we do not
report here, we consider policy rules which responds to the price in￿ation. We ￿nd that,
not surprisingly, the performance of the wage in￿ation rule is always better compared to
the price in￿ation rule.
8To ensure that all the sectoral weights in the optimal index are nonnegative, we impose
the constraint that all coe￿cients in this rule are nonnegative.
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it is the aggregate wage in￿ation.
5.3 Choice of Parameters
We use a discount factor ￿ of 0:99 which corresponds to the annual real inter-
est rate in the steady state of 4%. As discussed in Dixon and Kara (2005b),
we set ￿
LL = 4:5; which implies that intertemporal labour supply elasticity,
1=￿
LL, is 0:2; ￿= 6; which measures the elasticity of substitution between
goods and the relative aversion in consumption,￿
CC; as unity. Finally, we set
the ￿i to be 0.95 and the standard deviations of innovations to productivity
shocks ￿i to 0.02, which is a standard assumption in the literature (see for
example Huang and Liu (2005)).
6 Results
We now proceed to examine how the policy rules perform under alternative
assumptions regarding the distribution of contract lengths. To do this, we
allow for di￿erent distributions of contracts with the same mean in the GTE
framework and for each case, we evaluate the performance of the alternative
simple rules in comparison with that of under optimal policy. In order to
illustrate the nature of the problem faced by the monetary authority and
the implications sectoral heterogeneity for policy design, we start with the
simple case of a two sector GTEs, which is a common speci￿cation in the
literature. We then explore monetary policy implications of the model when
we allow for a range of contract lengths. For this, we use the empirical
distribution employed in Dixon and Kara (2005b) based on Taylor (1993).
This has a distribution of wage contract durations from 1 to 8 quarters based
on the US economy and the average duration contracts is 3.6 quarters9.
We compare this economy with the Calvo-GTE which has a wider range of
contract durations and the share of each duration is the same as generated by
9In Taylors US economy, the sizes of the sectors are ￿1 = 0:07; ￿2 = 0:19; ￿3 = 0:23,
￿4 = 0:21, ￿5 = 0:15, ￿6 = 0:08, ￿7 = 0:04, ￿8 = 0:03.
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length of 3.6 quarters as in Taylor’s US Economy. Welfare costs are expressed
in terms of the equivalent percentage decline in steady-state consumption.
6.1 Simple GTEs
We start with the simple case of a two sector GTEs, fT;￿g = f(2;T2);(0:5;0:5)g :
In sector 1 there are two period contracts and in sector 2, we allow the as-
sumed contract length to vary between complete ￿exibility (T2 = 1) and
8-period contracts (T2 = 8): We assume that sectors have equal shares.
We begin with comparing the performance of the alternative rules. As
￿gure 1 indicates, the sectoral rule outperforms the aggregate rule yields a
welfare outcome nearly identical to the optimal policy, except for the case
when sectors have identical contract lengths. Thus, a simple rule that puts
more weights on the sector that has longer contracts brings the welfare level
not far from the optimal policy. In addition, as ￿gure 2 shows, optimal
weight is an increasing function of the contract length. These results are
line with the ￿ndings of Benigno (2004) and Woodford (2003). In addition,
if one sector has fully ￿exible wages, then the central bank should react to
the sector which has sticky wages, which is in line with the ￿ndings of Aoki
(2001).
What is the intuition behind this ￿nding? As the ￿gure indicates, welfare
losses increase with the duration of the contract. This is because longer
contracts will adjust sluggishly in response to technology shocks and this
sluggish adjustment leads to a higher degree of price dispersion and welfare
cost of ￿uctuations in the economy. In addition, as it is pointed out by Dixon
and Kara (2005b), the presence of the longer contacts in￿uences the wage-
setting behaviour of short-term contracts and therefore there is a spillover
e￿ect from the sluggish long-contract sectors to the short-contract sectors via
the price level. Given the fact that the long contracts will adjust sluggishly
in response to technology shocks means that the shorter contracts will also
adjust sluggishly. As a result, the presence of longer contracts would be more
disruptive and would also lead to higher welfare loss. Hence, by putting more
weight on the sector that has longer contracts, the central bank can reduce
the degree of price dispersion and minimize the disruptive e￿ect of the longer
10For computational purposes, the distribution is truncated at i = 16 with the 16 period
contracts absorbing all of the weights from the longer contracts.
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contract sector.The aggregate in￿ation targeting is less e￿ective due to the reason that it
implicitly puts too much emphasis on the sector which has short contracts,
which can adjust more frequently in response to the shocks. This can perhaps
be best seen in the case in which one sector has a ￿exible contract and the
other has two period contracts. As Table 1 shows, the gain from switching
to the sectoral rule is as high as 84%.
6.2 Distribution of Contract Lengths
Thus far, we have considered the simple case in which there are two sectors.
We will next investigate how monetary policy should be set in an economy
in which there are more than two type of contract.
6.2.1 Taylor’s US Economy
Figure 3 reports the optimal weight in the optimal index which minimizes
welfare loss11. The result in the previous section, that the sectors with have
relatively higher contracts get higher weights than their sectoral share, still
holds. In addition, our analysis indicates that the central bank should com-
pletely ignore the sector which has ￿exible contracts, as in the case of simpler
GTE. But, the result that the optimal weight is an increasing function of
contract length does not generalize beyond the case of simple GTEs. As the
￿gure shows, the longer contracts which are more important in the optimal
index gets higher weights. The optimal weights are less than the correspond-
ing sectoral weight for the sectors which have relatively short contracts but
as the contract length increases, the sectors with longer contracts start to get
higher weights compared with the sectoral weights. But, as contract length
further increases, due to the reason that the sectoral shares fall, the optimal
weights decline. Thus, the policy implication of Taylor’s US Economy is that
sectoral share of the sector is as potentially important as the contract length
in determining the optimal weight in an optimal index.
We now examine how the aggregate rule performs in an economy in which
there is a distribution of contract lengths. As table 2 reports, the net bene￿t
11Note that a model with a distribution of contract lengths can increase the welfare
cost of ￿uctuations. More speci￿cally, a model with distribution of contract lengths can
make the welfare costs of ￿uctuations almost triple than what the simpler GTE suggets.
However, our main interest is not comparing welfare losses.
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shifting to the sectoral rule is quite modest and is only 1% relative to the
aggregate rule which suggests that the existence of heterogeneity of contract
length is almost irrelevant for monetary policy design.
One might suspect that the relatively low share of shorter contracts in this
distribution is mainly responsible for this, perhaps surprising, result. For ex-
ample, the share of ￿exible contracts is only 7%. As our analysis in the case
of simple GTE indicates, the gains in targeting a sectoral rule is substantial
when one sector has ￿exible wages but otherwise it is relatively small. Given
this concern, in Figure 4 we perform the same exercise as in table 1 but we
consider several cases in which the ￿exible sector share is higher. In particu-
lar, we assume that the share of the ￿exible sector in the economy is varied
from 0:07 to 0:5 and reallocate the remaining shares to the other sectors
according to their relative importance in the sectoral index. As the ￿gure
reveals, the performance of sectoral rule drops substantially when the ￿exi-
ble sector share is small. This result suggests that the shape of distribution
matters signi￿cantly for the monetary policy design. In particular, the gain
from targeting sector speci￿c in￿ations rather than the aggregate in￿ation
would be large in an economy where wages/prices reoptimized frequently12.
It is important to note that the gain in switching to the sectoral rule is
limited when there is a distribution of contract durations. This is because
in such a setting unavoidable losses are higher due to the presence of many
longer contracts. For example, as we found earlier in the case of two-sector
GTE where one sector has a ￿exible contract and the other one has two-
period contracts, the gain in switching to the sectoral rule is as high as 84%
when sectors have equal shares, whereas in a model with a wider range of
contract lengths this gain is only 20%, even when both speci￿cation ￿exible
sectors have the same shares in the economy.
6.2.2 Calvo-GTE
Finally, we consider the implications of Calvo-GTE which the share of each
sector is generated by Calvo distribution with a wider range of contract
lengths than Taylor’s US Economy. We assume that ! = 0:43; which the
mean of completed contract lengths in the economy is 3.6 quarters, as in
12Note that Levin, Onatski, Williams and Williams (2005), by using a model which
sunstantially di￿ers from ours, also ￿nd that the shape of distribution matters signi￿cantly
for monetary policy design.
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Figure 4, the Calvo-GTE and Taylor US economy have identical implications
for optimal weights. In particular, the optimal weights increase with the
contract length but decrease if the share of the sector decreases. As table
1 shows, the net bene￿t of the sectoral rule is still fairly small. Note that
the gain from the sectoral rule is somewhat higher than what the Taylor
US Economy suggests, even though both distributions has the same mean.
This is because the share of shorter contracts is higher than the Taylor US
Economy.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a general framework to analyze the design
of monetary policy rules, in which there can be many sectors with di￿erent
contract lengths. We have generalized the analysis of Rotemberg and Wood-
ford (1998) and derived a utility based objective function of a central bank
to provide a benchmark for evaluating the performance of alternative in￿a-
tion targeting monetary policy rules in an economy in which there are many
sectors with di￿erent contract lengths. Our ￿ndings can be summarized as
follows.
We ￿nd that a simple rule that responds to an appropriately weighted
average of the sectoral wage in￿ation rates yields a welfare outcome nearly
identical to the optimal policy and the performance of this rule is insensitive
to the assumptions regarding the distribution. The optimal weights assigned
to sectors depend on the sector share as well as the contract duration.
We ￿nd that the performance of the aggregate rule falls behind the sec-
toral rule because this rule implicitly puts more emphasis on stabilizing price
dispersion in sectors in which there are relatively shorter contracts. However,
our analysis indicates that the performance of this rule is sensitive to the as-
sumptions regarding the shape of the distribution of contract lengths. We
show that the performance of this rule almost identical to the performance of
the sectoral rule when we allow for a range of contract durations, suggesting
that it may not be necessary for a well designed monetary policy to respond
to sector-speci￿c in￿ations. However, our analysis shows that the bene￿ts of
switching to a sectoral rule can be greater in economies in which the share
of short contracts is high.
In future work, it would be interesting to explore monetary policy impli-
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goods and therefore di￿erent ￿s ; measure of the sensitivity of the optimal
wage to output in each sector, which we take as identical in this analysis.
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A second-order approximation of the period utility U(Ct) around steady state
yields:





t) + t:i:p + O(kak
3); (29)
where ct denotes the log-deviation of consumption from steady state, t:i:p
collects all the terms that are independent of policy and O(kak3) summarizes
all terms of the third or higher orders.
Using the fact that ~ c = ~ yt in our model and the de￿nition ~ yt = yt ￿ y￿
t;
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Similarly, taking a second order approximation of V (1￿Lt) around steady
state yields















t. Using (7) and aggregating for cohort j in sector i gives
~ lt = ~ yt + ut (31)


































where ~ pft = pft ￿ pt:
Taking a second-order approximation around the steady state yields
e




















































































































































Plugging (32), (31) into (30) and summing the resulting equation with
(29), and using the steady state relation UC(C)C = VL(1 ￿ L)L and (1 ￿
￿)y￿
t = (1 ￿ ￿ll)l￿
t; we obtain



















Note that we assume that ￿ = 1:
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Table 1: Welfare Losses relative to those under Optimal Policy
Optimal Policy Sectoral Rule Aggregate Rule
Taylor’s US Economy 0.1615 0.1624 0.1646
Calvo-GTE 0.1621 0.1621 0.1663
Table 2: Welfare comparisions with di￿erent distributions
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September 2006Figure 3: The weight on di￿erent sectors in Taylor’s US Economy
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September 2006Figure 4: The welfare losses relative to those under optimal policy
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September 2006Figure 5: The weight on di￿erent sectors in Calvo Economy
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